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DAMAGES IN SECTION

1983

ACTION CONTROLLED BY STATE LAW:

Jones v. Hildebrandt,
550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
INTRODUCTION

On June 16, 1977, the United States Supreme Court in a per
curiam opinion dismissed a petition for certiorari in the case of
Jones v. Hildebrant.' This opinion cast serious doubts upon the
continuing validity of the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the interplay between actions brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. section 19832 and the state's wrongful death statute.'
This comment will first examine the Colorado court's rationale in dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 action. Then the questions raised-and as yet left unanswered by the United States
Supreme Court's dismissal-will be discussed with an eye toward
the potential for a separate section 1983 recovery in Colorado
today.
I.

THE WRONG

On the evening of February 5, 1972, Denver police officers
Hildebrant and Moran, responding to a silent alarm, came upon
plaintiffs son, Larry Jones, in an alley next to an abandoned
building. Believing Larry to be a possible burglary suspect, Hildebrant gave chase, and when the suspect would not stop, Officer
Hildebrant drew his weapon, shot, and killed Larry Jones.'
Mrs. Ruby Jones, mother of the deceased, brought an action
on her own behalf against Officer Hildebrant and the City and
County of Denver in the state District Court for the City and
County of Denver. She sought compensatory and punitive damages for the allegedly unlawful killing of her son. As amended, her
complaint stated three claims for relief: (1) for battery under
550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1973). Action notwithstandingdeath.

When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or
the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall
be liable in an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the party
injured.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, Jones v. Hildebrant, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
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state law; (2) for negligence under state law; (3) for violation of
federal constitutional rights.5 The state court treated the first two
claims for relief as being authorized by the state wrongful death
statute, and the third was treated as authorized by section 1983.8
The defendants admitted the shooting but asserted that Officer Hildebrant was acting within the scope of his authority as a
Denver law enforcement officer.
The case proceeded to trial on all of plaintiff's claims. At the
close of proof, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's federal
claim. The trial judge granted the motion on the ground that the
section 1983 claim was "merged" with the state law claims, and
that no relief different from that recoverable under the statelaw claims was available under section 1983. The case thus went
to the jury on plaintiff's state-law claims only. On the issue of
damages, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff was limited
to recovering the net pecuniary loss she sustained as a result of
her son's death, with a maximum allowable recovery of $45,000;1
future earnings, loss of society, and exemplary damages were
held to be unrecoverable under the state wrongful death statute.,
The jury resolved the issues of liability under state law in favor
of the plaintiff and returned a verdict of $1,500. The trial judge
denied a motion for a new trial.'
550 P.2d at 341.
The complaint as filed was drawn in common law pleading style and made no
specific reference to either the state wrongful death provision or section 1983. However,
all courts in the case have construed claims one and two as being under the wrongful death
statute and claim number three as being authorized by section 1983.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (1973). Limitation on damages.
(1) All damages accruing under section 13-21-201 shall be sued for and
recovered by the same parties and in the same manner as provided in section
13-21-201, and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they
may deem fair and just, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from
such death, to the surviving parties who may be entitled to sue; and also
having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any
such wrongful act, neglect, or default; except that if the decedent left neither
a widow, widower, nor minor children, nor a dependent father or mother, the
damages recoverable in such action shall not exceed forty-five thousand
dollars. No action shall be brought and no recovery shall be had under both
section 13-21-201 and section 13-21-202 and in all cases the plaintiff is required to elect under which he will proceed.
For a critical discussion of the Colorado pecuniary loss limitation, see, Note, Blind
Imitation of the Past:An Analysis of Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, 49
DEN. L.J. 99 (1972) (authored by David K. Rees, counsel for plaintiff in Jones).
I Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Jones v. Hildebrant, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
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A.

Appeal

Mrs. Jones then appealed the lower court's verdict on the
issue of damages. Of the three allegations made on appeal, only
one, petitioner's claim that the federal section 1983 cause of action should not have been "merged" with the state wrongful
death action, will be discussed in this comment.' 0
In support of the uniqueness of her federal claim, petitioner
advanced four distinct theories which were recognized and discussed by the Colorado court." The first theory, which was described by Justice Hodges in his majority opinion as being
"confusingly stated," was that petitioner's "civil right to her son's
life," as recognized by the state wrongful death statute, "was
denied her without due process of law through his wrongful killing.' 1 2 The court interpreted this claim as being solely an attempt
to exercise a right to sue for damages. The court then turned to a
discussion of what constitutes a right to "property" or "liberty"
as set forth in the recent United States Supreme Court case, Paul
v. Davis.11
In Davis, a section 1983 action for injuries allegedly inflicted
upon plaintiff's reputation, the Court ruled that the right to sue
for defamation was not a "liberty" or "property" right protected
by the fourteenth amendment.'
On the basis of this decision, the Colorado court reached the
conclusion that
[t]he right to sue becomes a right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment only when the statutorily guaranteed access to the
courts is denied. Therefore, where, as here, the state allows a plaintiff to bring her suit, she is not deprived of any of her civil rights
without due process of law."
, Mrs. Jones asserted three issues on her appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court: (1)
Her damages under the wrongful death statute were unconstitutionally restricted by the
net pecuniary loss rule; (2) her recovery was inadequate, as a matter of law; and (3)
additional damages should have been permitted under her section 1983 claim because that
cause of action was not limited by the pecuniary loss rule. 550 P.2d at 341.
"Id. at 341-45.
" Justice Hodges wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Kelly did not participate. Chief Justice Pringle, joined by Justice Groves, dissented, saying, "I respectfully
dissent. I do not believe that Colorado's judicial limitation of net pecuniary loss as a
measure of damages for wrongful death applies to actions founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)." Id. at 346.
"

424 U.S. 693 (1976).

Id. at 712.
550 P.2d at 343.
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The second of plaintiff's arguments was that although section 1983 does not expressly create a wrongful death action for a
violation of civil rights, a different section of the same act, section
1988,11 "authorizes the incorporation into federal law of state
wrongful death remedies to vindicates of civil rights that result
in death."' 7 The court agreed with petitioner's claim on this point
and also agreed that the purpose of the incorporation was to
"effectually implement the policies of the legislation."", However,
the court would not accept the second part of plaintiff s argument
that although section 1988 required incorporation of state law in
certain circumstances it did not require the acceptance of the
state limitations regarding damages. The Colorado Supreme
Court concluded
that Colorado's wrongful death remedy would be engrafted into a
§1983 action if brought in a federal court. However, because the
instant suit was brought in State court and joined with a suit under
the state wrongful death statute, the trial court properly ruled that
the two actions were merged so that the §1983 claim should be
dismissed.
Furthermore, because the allowable damages are such an integral part of the right to bring a wrongful death remedy, we believe
the state's law on damages should also apply."9

'

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970): Proceedings in vindication of civil rights.

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in
all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
the law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the
said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
/d.
I7

The Colorado court as 550 P.2d 339, 343, n.4, set forth the proposition that federal
courts have ruled that section 1988 permits the incorporation of the state's nonabatement
statutes and wrongful death statutes into section 1983 actions in order to effectively
implement the policies of that legislation. In support of this proposition the court referenced the following cases: Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Hall v. Wooten,
506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961); Javits v.
Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Troutman v. Johnson City, 392 F. Supp. 556
(E.D. Tenn. 1973).
1 550 P.2d at 344.
"
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The court also rejected petitioner's third theory of recovery,
"that a federal wrongful death remedy impliedly exists in section
1983, independent of the state wrongful death remedies." 20 While
acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court had ruled
that federal wrongful death remedies impliedly exist in some
areas of the law,22 the court decided to base its decision on three
other factors: (1) The court's perception of Congressional intent
not to preempt state remedies in the area of wrongful death, (2)
the adequacy of the state remedy in death cases to vindicate
civil rights violations, and (3) the "overwhelming acceptance of
2' 3
state remedies in the federal courts.
Petitioner's final theory for obtaining a separate recovery
under her section 1983 claim was that she was deprived of her own
constitutional rights. In the words of Justice Hodges, "[S]he
alleges in her complaint that her rights were violated because her
child's right to life, his freedom from physical abuse and intimidation, and his right to equal protection of the laws were violated. 1 4 The court concluded, however, that these deprivations
were really those of the son and that
one may not sue for deprivation of another's rights under § 1983, and
that a cause of action can be maintained only by the "person injured." She therefore cannot sue in her own right for the deprivation
of her son's rights apart from her remedy under the wrongful death
25
cause of action.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the state, by wrongfully killing Mrs. Jones' son, did not directly attempt to restrict
her own personal decisions relating to procreation, contraception,
and child rearing which were involved in cases such as Griswold
v. Connecticut 6 and Meyer v. Nebraska.n The court concluded:
Although the death of a family member represents a loss to her, we
nonetheless, are of the opinion that § 1983 was not designed to
Id. at 344.
The case acknowledged by the court was Morange v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375 (1970), where the United States Supreme Court held that an implied action for
wrongful death based upon the seaworthiness of a vessel was maintainable under federal
maritime law. Id. at 345, n.10.
55 P.2d 339.
Id. at 345.
2,Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 345 (footnotes omitted).
- 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
- 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2
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compensate for those collateral losses resulting from injuries to others. Otherwise damages would infinitely extend not only to parents
and children, but to siblings and perhaps even to a "family" of close
friends. The interestsprotected by §1983 are adequately vindicated
when actions are brought by injured parties themselves, or at their
death, by those designated in our wrongful death statute.2"

II.

THE RIGHT

As is so often the case in legislation born out of compromise,
section 1983 is general in its language and utilizes terms not carefully defined. Courts which have sought guidance within the provisions of the statute itself have been frustrated by its lack of
specificity. Others, which have turned to the legislative history of
the act, have found strong advocacy in favor of a multitude of
positions. Thus, lawmakers have found in section 1983 a flexible
legal tool. Passed in the post-Civil War reconstruction period to
provide a remedy for plaintiffs who were not receiving adequate
protection from state laws, it lay dormant for almost half a century. 25

The case in which the statutory skeleton of section 1983 was
first firmly fleshed out by the Court was Monroe v. Pape.30
Monroe involved an illegal search and seizure of a black couple's
home by thirteen Chicago policemen.' In his opinion, Justice
Douglas examined the legislative history of the section and formalized "three main aims" of the act: (1) To "override certain
kinds of state laws"; (2) to "provide a remedy where state law was
inadequate"; and (3) to provide "a federal remedy where the state
remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.

'3 2

These three goals of section 1983 as formulated by Justice

Douglas are significant in that they have provided the authority
by which subsequent courts have been able to expand the scope
of the section 1983 cause of action.
After Monroe, there was a rapid increase in cases filed under
section 1983. 3 Many offenses which had previously been actiona550 P.2d at 345 (emphasis added).

Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy,
26 IND. L.J. 361, 362 (1951).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
31 Id. at 174.
2 Id. at 183.

According to one source:
Between the enactment of the statute [§ 1983] in 1871 and 1939, only 19 §
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ble only in state courts under state tort theories became section
1983 violations.
More recently, the Court, in an attempt to stem the "rush
to the federal" courthouse," has begun to give a more restrictive
interpretation to the prerequisites of a section 1983 cause of action."

In Paul v. Davis36 the Court made a direct attack upon the
substantive rights protected under the fourteenth amendment
and thus actionable under section 1983.
In Davis, an individual attempted to secure damages under
section 1983 against police officers for alleged damage to reputation. The plaintiffs picture had been circulated on a flyer identifying "active shoplifters" despite the fact that charges against the
plaintiff for shoplifting had been dropped.
The Court recognized that the police activity would have
been actionable under the law of defamation in the state court,
but ruled that this alone was insufficient to support a section 1983
action even though state officials happened to be the defendants.
This decision relied on the fact that in addition to the "under
color of state law" requirement, section 1983, unlike state tort
actions, required the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
right. Unlike the clearly unconstitutional search and seizure present in Monroe, the plaintiff in Paul v. Davis was unable to point
to any specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding one's reputation from state intervention. Thus he could show no cognizable
liberty deprivation. The Court observed that the due process
clause alone was not in itself a source of protected liberty interests
so as to become an embodiment of general tort law.
1983 cases were reported. In fiscal 1960, the year prior to Monroe, only 280
cases were filed. By 1970, the number had mushroomed to 3,586, and the
upward trend continued in 1971 with a 30 percent increase to 4,609. One
estimate placed the number of actions filed in 1973 at approximately 8,000.
Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 FLA. L. REV.
904, 915 (1976).
1 Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & SOCIAL ORDEa 557, 559.
1 For a discussion of the post-Monroe restrictions on the Civil Rights Act, See, Note,
Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 FLA. L. REv. 904
(1976); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1486 (1969); Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court: Cutting the
Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49 (1976).
- 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Davis was a verbalization of the Court's growing disenchantment with section 1983 as a cure-all statutory remedy. It was also
the case cited by the Colorado court in its rejection of Mrs. Jones'
section 1983 claim. At the time Jones came to trial in Colorado,
it was clear, under Monroe, that civil rights suits could be
brought against state officials alleging specific constitutional
deprivations such as illegal search and seizure. This protection
was specifically provided for by the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. However under Davis, other interests such as reputation were not actionable under section 1983 due to the Court's
failure to recognize them as being fundamental rights. Other than
these specific cases, lower courts had little upon which to base
decisions in the area. 7 Yet it was clear that fears of a federalization of the state tort system had prompted a new wave of courtimposed limitations on section 1983 actions.
Some issues, such as what rights were protected under section 1983, had been established as clearly federal concerns. For
other issues, such as which statute of limitation to apply, the use
of state law was well settled." Other issues, however, such as the
survivability of actions, defenses available, and measure of damages, were not so easily categorized. For assistance, the courts
looked to a second provision of the Civil Rights Act.
Section 1988 addressed the question of what law should
apply in proceedings taken in vindication of civil rights. The
section provides that federal law shall control where "suitable"
and that state law shall be used to achieve the purposes of the
act or to provide suitable remedies where federal law is deficient. 9
This concept, however, is more simply stated than applied
as is shown in the almost ten years of litigation surrounding the
4"
infamous section 1983 case, Shaw v. Garrison.
I One test proposed by commentators is Judge Friendly's opinion in Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), where it was suggested that conduct which "shocked
the conscience," as defined in cases such as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
would allow an action to be brought under section 1983. Comment, Section 1983 and the
New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49 (1976).
" In O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914), an action arising out of the predecessors
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was held that there was no federal limitations statute applicable
to a civil damage action under the federal civil rights statutes and that the limitation
statutes of the state in which the cause of action arose controlling.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
,o 391 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. La. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, U.S.
- (1978). See note 44, infra.
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In Shaw, a civil action was brought by plaintiff against Garrison and others with whom he allegedly conspired to deprive
Shaw of his civil rights by prosecuting him in bad faith for conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy."
After the commencement of the action, but prior to trial, the
plaintiff died. He was not survived by any of the classes of individuals upon whom an action, other than one for damage for
property, inured under Louisiana law.
It was clear that state law could be properly incorporated
into section 1983 when it furthered the court-interpreted purposes
of the Civil Rights Act. 2 In Shaw, however, the more difficult
situation was presented. The district court was forced to decide
whether to incorporate a state survival provision it felt was contrary to the purpose of section 1983 and allow the action to abate
or to turn to federal law. The court refused to apply state law,
finding it inconsistent with federal law, and in its place created
a "federal common law of survival in civil rights actions in favor
of the personal representative of the deceased."' 3 Thus, at the
time Jones came to trial in Colorado, Shaw clearly stood for the
proposition that state law need not be incorporated via section
1988 when it stood in opposition to the purposes of section 1983."
The complaint alleged causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
42 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). The Supreme Court said of section 1988 in Sullivan v.

Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969):
This means, as we read § 1988, that both federal and state rules on
damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in
the federal statute. The rule of damages, whether drawn from federal or state
sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need wherever a federal right is
impaired.
Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
,1 391 F. Supp. at 1368. A similar result was obtained in the following cases: Spence
v. Stares, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Rhoads
v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer,
251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Tracy v. Robbins, 40 F.R.D. 108 (C.D.S.C. 1966);
Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
" Subsequent to the dismissal of certiorari in Jones, Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. La. 1976), was first affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, 545 F.2d 980 (1977), and then reversed by the Supreme Court, sub nom.
Robertson v. Wegmann, U.S.
(1978). Three justices, including two of the dissentors in Jones (White and Brennan), joined in a strongly worded dissent.
The majority opinion accepted the basic thrust of the plaintiff's argument that state
law need not be incorporated into section 1983 actions when inconsistent with the purposes
of the act, yet ruled that in the situation presented, Louisiana law was not so at odds with
the purposes of section 1983 as to be stricken in favor of federal common law. Robertson
v. Wegmann, U.S.
- (1978).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.

55

This was the precedent which Mrs. Jones presented to the
Colorado Supreme Court upon appeal. She argued that the restrictive Colorado provisions regarding damages were too inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983 to be incorporated into
the federal statute. It was argued that the Colorado Supreme
Court should reject the state's damage limitations just as the
federal district court had rejected Louisiana's limitation on survivability."
III. THE REMEDY
If a plaintiffs interests are to be protected by a state statute
to such an extent that the federal action may be dismissed, one
would think that the remedy available in the state courts would
be completely coextensive with that available in the federal
courts. However, an examination of the provisions of the Colorado
wrongful death statute quickly points out severe limitations present at the state level which are not present in the federal action.
The Colorado wrongful death statute, as interpreted by the
Colorado Supreme Court, is limited only to the recovery of compensatory damages for the loss of decedent's services and support
and does not permit the recovery of damages for the survivor's
grief, sorrow, and emotional distress."5 In addition, the trial court
in Jones ruled that the wrongful death statute did not permit the
recovery of punitive damages, nor a recovery in excess of $45,000
because the plaintiff was not dependent upon the deceased.46
Also, Colorado has expressly described the wrongful death action
as being only a "property tort action" and not as a tort action "for
injuries done to the person." 7 Finally, the Colorado statute says
nothing about compensation for the loss of a civil right.
The Court admittedly limited the decision:
Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which no claim
is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions
and in which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it
may cause abatement of the action, has no independent adverse effect on the
policies underlying § 1983. A different situation might well be presented...
if state law "did not provide for survival of any tort actions," or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive. We intimate no view
moreover, about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in
a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death.
Id. at (citations omitted).
550 P.2d at 342.
, Id. at 341.
,7Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949).
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Clearly these limitations do not apply to an action brought
pursuant to section 1983. The Colorado court realized that it was
under a duty, when evaluating the section 1983 claim, to interpret
and apply federal law. The court agreed with the plaintiff that
section 1983 did not expressly create a survival action, and that
section 1988 required the incorporation of state law. However, it
was at this point that the Colorado court decided that section
1988 mandated the conclusion that the Colorado remedy constituted the exclusive determinate of damages and remedies available under a section 1983 action.48 The court acknowledged that
it was applying federal law via section 1988, yet failed to look
beyond the familiar state law to a body of well established federal
common law in fashioning a remedy.4"
The Colorado court based its dismissal of plaintiff's section
1983 action upon the grounds that it was "merged" with the state
statutory remedy. The court did not further define this term nor
did it cite authority for the proposition. The commonly accepted
definition of the term "merger" as applied to causes of actions
refers to the situation where one person takes or acquires "a remedy in legal estimation higher than that he already possesses for
the same right." 50 It is then said that by exercising your right to
the greater remedy you allow the lesser right to merge into the
cause of action pursued.'
It is hard to see how this definition applies to a section 1983
cause of action brought in a state court. Section 1983 actions by
definition must involve constitutional violations which would
" The Colorado court in Jones stated that the state's wrongful death limitations
would be "engrafted" into a section 1983 action even if brought in a federal court. 550 P.2d
at 344. However, section 1983 does not mandate this result. As discussed above section
1988 operates only when federal common law is found deficient, and then incorporates
state law only to the extent that it is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1970).
11 It has been held that where federally protected rights have been invaded, the courts
will adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. This is true even though the
federal statute provides for only a general right to sue for such invasion and does not
address an available remedy to make good the wrong done. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946).
BIACK's LAW DICONARY 1140 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
The term merger has also been used in criminal law where the identical
criminal act constitutes two or more offenses such as where the same act is
both a felony and a misdemeanor. The rule is the lower grade merges with
the higher. State v. Smith, 190 Mo. 706, 90 S.W. 440 (1905).
, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1140 (4th ed. rev. 1968).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

presumptively be placed on a legal tier higher than that of state
common law or statutory causes of action.
Section 1983 is a vehicle for the vindication of individual
constitutional rights. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Monroe stressed that the "deprivation of a constitutional right is
significantly different from and more serious than a violation of
a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even
though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the
deprivation of a constitutional right." 2 This description of section 1983 hardly seems to place it in the mergable category.
Possibly, the Colorado court meant by the term "merger"
that two actions were identical from the standpoint of remedies
available; however, since section 1983 provides a more extensive
remedy than the Colorado wrongful death act, with its $45,000
maximum recovery, this does not seem to be the case. In comparison to the plaintiff's wrongful death actions, section 1983 is
clearly a separate legal remedy. The section was enacted for a
specific purpose, at a different time, granting jurisdiction for
different offenses, to remedy different ills, in a different way than
does the Colorado wrongful death statute. Section 1983 has no
net pecuniary loss limitation imposed. Section 1983 has no statutory limitation for individuals without dependents. Additionally,
5
the section has been interpreted to allow punitive damages.
The two actions are clearly not identical, nor do they provide
equal remedies.
The identity of remedies was crucial to the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling, but, as seen above, the remedies simply are
not identical. Under federal law the loss of a civil right alone is
compensable, even though it is not accompanied by a pecuniary
loss. 5 The measure of compensation in section 1983 actions,
56
though at times difficult to assess, has been considered great.
365 U.S. at 196.
It has been generally held that where two causes of action are granted by statute
without the second enactment expressly or impliedly supplanting or abrogating the first,
the newer remedy is not to be considered exclusive but rather cumulative. This is true
even where the separate remedies are given under state and federal statutes. Jenkins v.
S. Ry. Carolina Div., 152 S.C. 386, 150 S.E. 128 (1929) (allowing joinder of a cause of
action brought under Federal Employers Liability Act and a state wrongful death statute).
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
" Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
" Faber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"

3
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The Colorado decision limiting plaintiffs solely to the wrongful
death provisions has prevented every consideration of whether or
not such plaintiffs should be compensated for a constitutional
deprivation.
IV. THE RATIONALE
The Colorado court dismissed plaintiffs section 1983 claim,
saying that her rights were adequately protected by the state
cause of action and the state remedy. This conclusion was
reached by an analysis which emphasized that if a federal cause
of action existed-whether brought in a federal or state court-it
would be controlled completely by the state damage limitations.
This basic assumption lies at the heart of the Colorado court's
rejection on all four of plaintiff's arguments for the establishment
of a section 1983 claim.
Apparently, what the Colorado court did was to look at the
interest sought to be protected and decide that it either was not
protectable under the rationale of Davis or was adequately protected by the bringing of a wrongful death action in state court.
Thus, the section 1983 action was dismissed.
The same rationale was used in rejecting plaintiffs second
argument for her section 1983 claim. The court agreed with plaintiff that the statute itself was silent on survival and that section
1988 required resort to state law to the extent that such state law
was compatible with federal law. However, the majority of the
court would not accept petitioner's contention that the Colorado
statutory limitations, such as the net pecuniary loss provision,
were totally incompatible with the interests protected under section 1983. By accepting state law as being completely compatible
with the purposes of section 1983, the court was not forced to
apply the next echelon of authority-federal common law. 57
Petitioner's third argument began where her second left off.
The claim stressed that, even in the absence of section 1988 (directing courts to state law where compatible), section 1983 itself
created a constitutionalcause of actions independent of state law
limitations. The Colorado court recognized that such a right to
federal wrongful death remedies impliedly did exist in some limited areas; however, they refused to accept these cases as being
'7

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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controlling in Jones. Instead, the court relied upon a perceived
Congressional intention not to preempt the state's "carefully
'5 8
wrought wrongful death remedies.
While this argument has some validity it is by no means
conclusive. Federal courts do develop rules of law and decisions
in selected areas of particular federal concern.5 9 It would appear
that the protection of civil rights as defined in the Constitution
would be such an area of federal concern even in the absence of
the provisions of section 1988.
In Morange v. States Marine Lines Inc.,10 the case acknowledged by the Colorado court, a plaintiff sought to bring a wrongful death action against the owner of a vessel upon which her
husband had been killed. At the time of the husband's death the
vessel was within the navigable waters of the state of Florida.
Neither federal statute nor Florida law provided for a wrongful
death action based upon the seaworthiness of a vessel. Yet, in
Morange the Court held that an action does lie under general
maritime law for death caused by violation of general maritime
duties. Thus, the creation of remedies for wrongful death is not
limited merely to statutory law, and there exists authority for the
creation of wrongful death actions within federal common law
also. This position, however, was rejected by the Colorado court
in favor of a perceived Congressional intent not to preempt state
wrongful death remedies. Yet, federal preemption has been exercised in at least two areas involving wrongful death actions. A
federal policy in favor of the survivability of wrongful death actions and the awarding of punitive damages has been applied as
a matter of federal common law in clear opposition to state policies. Such preemption has been exercised whenever state law has
been found to be in opposition to the purpose of section 1983.
Petitioner's final and potentially most significant argument
in favor of a separate section 1983 claim received but superficial
treatment by the Colorado court. This was the claim that she was
550 P.2d at 345.
See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie - and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383 (1964). Among the areas where federal courts are developing a common law,
Friendly lists interstate disputes, some national banking practices, government contract
law, labor contract law, unfair competition, regulation of interstate carriers, and defamation by multi-state media. 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408-18.
398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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deprived of her own constitutional rights by the police shooting
of her son. Although the court said these rights were not very well
articulated, the issue was definitely before the court. The Colorado court stated that there was no deprivation of a constitutional
right because the state did not directly attempt to restrict plaintiff's own personal decisions relating to procreation, contraception, and child rearing which were issues involved in cases such
2 The quesas Griswold v. Connecticut6 and Meyer v. Nebraska."
tion thus presented was, what is the definition of a legally protectable liberty interest? The term "liberty," as contained in the
due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, has
been held to denote more than mere freedom from bodily restraint. It also guarantees the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and to bring up
children.63 The Court has clearly recognized the right to procreate;' Jones posited the question whether this right to conceive
children could be expanded to give a mother the right to raise her
child free from any wrongful taking by the state.
This specific question was addressed by the Eighth Circuit
in a case which is strikingly similar to Jones on its facts, Mattis
v. Schnarr15 In Schnarr, a father whose son had been shot and
killed while attempting to escape arrest as a fleeing felon, brought
a section 1983 action against the police officers who shot his son.
The two cases differed, however, on the defenses asserted. In
Schnarr, the defenses of good faith and probable cause were accepted by the district court and the action was dismissed. The
court of appeals reversed the district court and held that although
the defenses of good faith and probable cause were available to
the officers in the action for damages, the father did have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. The case turned on
the issue of whether the plaintiff had standing to bring an action
at all. The defendants relied, as did the Colorado court in Jones,
on the argument that one may not sue for the deprivation of the
'

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

62

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

11Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 290 (1923).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 523 (1942).
502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
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civil rights of another. The court established a two-step process
by which it tested the plaintiff's standing in the action: (1) The
party seeking relief must show that he is sufficiently affected by
the action he is challenging to justify consideration by the court
of the validity of the action; and (2) the plaintiff must show the
action complained of affects him and not some third party. 6
The court found that the father was sufficiently affected by
the killing of his son to justify the court's considering the matter,
reasoning that the state wrongful death statute created a vested
right in the plaintiff to bring suit for the death of his minor son.
The right was viewed as not being derivative, but rather, a new
cause of action created in the father. The ground given for recovery was "the reciprocal duty of the child to render to its parents
such services and earnings as the latter may reasonably expect."6 7
The court quoted with approval a Missouri Supreme Court case
which ruled that "the right of a parent to a minor's services is in
the nature of a personal right arising out of the family relationship, not a property right arising out of a psuedo contractual
relationship. "68
In Schnarr the parent was found to be the "injured party"
under section 1983, and was seen to be suing in his own right for
injuries personally sustained. 6 This qualified him under the first
of the court's two-part test for standing.
The court then turned to what it considered the more difficult question-whether the killing of plaintiff's son invaded his
constitutionally protected rights under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. As most courts have done, the justices looked to see whether the interest was so deeply rooted in
the traditions of Anglo-American law as to be considered fundamental. Citing Meyer and Griswold, the court focused on the
familial relationship between parent and child and decided that
such a relationship was indeed fundamental70 and that the police
0 Id. at 593.

67Id.
U Mennemeyer

v. Hart, 359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960, 962 (1949) (quoted in Mattis
v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974)).

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"The entire fabric of the Constitution and its purposes that clearly underlie its
specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise
a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1964).
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officers did deny the plaintiff a civil liberty-the right to raise a
son.
Schnarr was decided by the Eighth Circuit two years prior
to the Colorado high court's review of Jones, yet it was not mentioned in the court's opinion.
V.

THE REVIEW

At the time Jones was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, Colorado's position was clear: Section 1983 was
silent on the issue of damages; section 1988 mandated resort to
state law in such situations; Colorado's wrongful death statute
was totally compatible with the purposes and objectives of section 1983; and thus it was totally controlling in both actions to
the extent that the federal cause of action became a mere redundancy of the state redress. The Colorado court had ruled that
merger was appropriate, that no section 1983 action exists independent of state law, that a survivor may not sue under section
1983 for injuries suffered by the deceased, and that any damages
recoverable under section 1983 would be limited by Colorado law
to direct pecuniary loss. As shown above, these rulings were contrary to those of a majority of the state and federal courts which
had addressed these issues.
The case was ripe for review. The United States Supreme
Court had not previously had an opportunity to address the issue
as to what the appropriate measure of damages is in such an
action. Additionally, the petitioner was arguing that the shooting
of a child was a constitutional deprivation of a civil right protected by the liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment. This
issue also had never been addressed by the nation's highest court.
It appeared that the case would turn upon a discussion of two
issues: (1) A Davis type discussion as to what is or what is not a
valid protectable liberty interest; and (2) whether or not a state's
net pecuniary loss rule is consistent with the purposes of the Civil
Rights Act?
Unfortunately, the court declined to discuss these important
issues. Instead the justices split 5-3 (one justice not hearing the
case) as to what had actually been presented to the Colorado
court. Five justices, as stated in their per curiam opinion, believed that there had been a shift in the posture of the case upon
appeal. These justices ruled that the question presented in the
petition for certiorari had been mooted by petitioner's oral argu-
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ment. Thus the writ of certiorari was dismissed as being
"improvidently granted.''"
The rationale given by the Court for the dismissal was that
they had granted certiorari to look at the issue of damages; that
is, to see if the Colorado state limitation was proper in the section
1983 action. A necessary prerequisite for this review, as stated by
the Court, was that the plaintiff must be suing for the same injury
under section 1983 as he is under the state wrongful death statute.
The Court reasoned that this situation could not exist if the damages sought under section 1983 were for injuries to a different
plaintiff than the one allegedly wronged under the state statute.
The majority argued that petitioner had shifted her case to a
different wrong upon oral argument-the deprivation of the
mother's right to raise her child without interference. Citing the
Colorado position that wrongful death is only a property tort
action, not an action for injuries to the person, the Court said that
the two actions were clearly distinct.72
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, however, felt that
the question of a mother's deprivation of a constitutionally protected right had been sufficiently raised in the Colorado Supreme
Court. These justices believed that the issues were important
and should have been decided. In support of their position, they
pointed to the Colorado court's specific rejection of each of petitioner's claims in support of her 1983 action, specifically the
fourth claim where she alleged violation of her own constitutional
rights. The minority cited the allegations made in petitioner's
original complaint which clearly could be read so as to include a
claim for invasion of the mother's own civil liberties.7 3 In the
1, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977). The Court cited Supreme Court Rule 23(1)(c) and Belcher
v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1926), as authority for the dismissal.
72 Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 28 P.2d 930 (1949).
' Both the per curiam and the minority opinions cited portions of petitioner's complaint as authority for their respective positions as to what had actually been set forth
below. The majority cited a somewhat edited version of petitioner's third claim (the
section 1983 claim) to support their contention that a case for the deprivation of the
mother's civil rights had not been sufficiently made. The majority opinion, in contrast,
quoted the third claim in full. This claim taken in full context clearly may be read as to
include a definite constitutional claim for the deprivation of the petitioner's own civil
rights.
A comparison of the two footnotes is set forth below:
Per Curiam note six:
6. Her complaint alleged that she was deprived of:
"a. Her child's right to life
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words of Justice White, "[tihese issues were addressed directly
by the Colorado Supreme Court, and I doubt that that court
misunderstood the scope of the litigation before it or reached and
decided issues not fairly presented by the appeal."7
The minority opinion added that, in addition to the question
of whether a mother's civil liberties included the right to raise a
son free from state interference, the question of the state damage
limitation was also a valid question for review.
CONCLUSION

As it now stands in Colorado, state damage limitations appear to control federal actions brought in state court in conjunction with state statutory claims. This is in spite of an express
overruling of the Colorado decision by a minority of the United
States Supreme Court and a definite effort to avoid endorsement
of the decision by a majority of the justices.
The situation in Colorado at present is that the Jones decision stands as a very weak precedent for future plaintiffs. The
results of the decision might be attacked on one of several
grounds. First, a future plaintiff will be careful to sue in behalf
of the estate of the deceased to avoid any problems with the issue
of standing. Once standing is firmly established, a direct attack
on the damage issue may be launched by showing the incompatibility of the state net pecuniary loss rule with the aims and purposes of the federal Civil Rights Act. Section 1988 does not re"b. The right to her child's freedom from physical abuse, coercion,
intimidation, and physical death; and
"c. Her right to her children's equal protection of the laws."
Nowhere does she allege her asserted constitutional right to raise her child.
97 S. Ct. 2283, 2286 n.6 (1977).
Justice White's note two:
2. Petitioner's first two claims for relief were grounded on state law. The
third claim for relief stated:
"During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Douglas Hildebrant
while acting under color of law, intentionally deprived the Plaintiff of her
rights, security and liberty secured to her by the Constitutionof the United
States, including but not limited to:
"a. Her child's right to life;
"b. The right to her child's freedom from physical abuse, coercion,
intimidation, and physical death; and
"c. Her right to her children's equal protection of the law." App. 3.
(emphasis added).
97 S. Ct. 2283, 2288, n.2 (1977).
1, 97 S. Ct. at 2290.
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quire the incorporation of such inconsistent provisions. The Supreme Court has left open for future decisions the evaluation of
a mother's rights in the raising of a child. Clearly a Schnarr-type
argument could be made that the right to raise a child free from
state interference is a fundamentally protected civil liberty.
In any case, the failure of the Colorado courts to fairly address these issues in the light of recent case law and the hesitancy
of a majority of the United States Supreme Court to address the
liberty issue has done much to confuse and little to clarify statefederal relationships in the context of section 1983 actions.,'
Bruce A. Lampert
7' The fact that the issues presented in Jones have merely been postponed and not
resolved is exemplified by a recent filing in the Colorado District Court. Walter Gerash,
one of the attorneys for the petitioner in Jones, has been retained by the survivors of
Arthur Espinoza, a victim of a July 30th shooting in Curtis Park by a Denver policeman.
The issues presented in Jones have again been raised.
In his pleadings Mr. Gerash has not filed a wrongful death action at all, but rather
he has filed only a section 1983 claim. In addition, the action is being brought in the name
of the estate of Mr. Espinoza, pleading deprivation of his constitutional rights as well as
those of his family. The validity of the Colorado decision in Jones will be tested shortly.

